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CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
an active market value is shown, the average prices at which
sales are consummated, whether above or below asset value,
cannot properly be ignored.
A rule definitely fixing either asset value or market
value as the test to determine fair value clearly fails to
recognize that value when applied to stocks is a combina-
tion of many elements none of which can be ignored. The
ultimate result must be an analysis of all existing elements
not as entities but as relationships. The closer a court ap-
proaches establishing a specific test the farther it will have
strayed from establishing the correct general test.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR DURESS WHERE
PRE-MARITAL RELATIONS HAVE OCCURRED-
LURZ V. LURZ1
Plaintiff-appellee-husband, through his father and next
friend, filed a bill of complaint in equity against defendant-
appellant-wife, seeking an annulment of their marriage.
The bill alleged that, at a time when plaintiff was fifteen
years of age and defendant twenty, the latter "by solicita-
tion and womanly arts" induced plaintiff frequently to co-
habit with her with the result that, after about two years,
she became pregnant; that after discovering this the de-
fendant "threatened and coerced by deceit and fraud" the
plaintiff into marrying her, the threats including a threat
to have him arrested if he failed to support the child; that
the plaintiff and defendant went to Ellicott City where the
defendant caused the plaintiff to "wait outside of a building
in said city as he looked too young to have a marriage
license issued" while she went into said building and pro-
cured the license by perjured testimony as to plaintiff's
age; that before a minister in said city the parties went
through a "form of ceremony which the complainant now
understands and believes to have been the usual marriage
ceremony." The child was born seven or eight months
later and the plaintiff's parents first learned of the mar-
riage about a month and a half after the birth. The bill
was filed six days after that and sought both an annulment
and that the infant child be maintained by plaintiff in a
home to be selected by the Court. From an order over-
ruling her demurrer to the bill and directing her to answer,
defendant appeals. Held, Affirmed and cause remanded
1170 Md. 428, 184 AtI. 906, 185 AtI. 676 (dissenting opinion) (1936).
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for further proceedings. The case was heard by all eight
of the judges of the Court of Appeals. One judge filed
a concurring opinion and two dissented, one of these by
opinion. The Court held that while the burden of proof
on the plaintiff may be high, yet the allegations of the bill
were sufficient to require an answer and to permit of a trial
on the merits.
Jurisdiction to grant an annulment of marriage for the
so-called "contract impediments" exists in a court of equity
without the aid of any statute expressly conferring it, as an
incident of the equitable jurisdiction to reform and rescind
contracts.2 Thus, upon appropriate proof, annulments may
be granted for lack of contractual intention,8 for insanity,"
intoxication,5 fraud,6 and duress.7 The theory is that no
valid marriage exists, either for lack of actual contractual
intention, for lack of capacity to give a valid consent, or
because the apparent consent was induced by fraud or
duress and is, hence, no real consent at all. This last factor
explains annulments for fraud and/or duress.8 While the
bill in the principal case alleged a combination of fraud and
2 Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland 479, 483 (1828) ; Le Brun v. Le Brun, 55
Md. 496, 502-503 (1881) ; Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 298, 29 Atl. 597 (1894).
a Madden, Domestic Relations, See. 5; II Schouler, Domestic Relations,
Sec. 1075; Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524 (1883) where the annulment was
denied on the facts; Owings v. Owings, 141 Md. 416, 118 Atl. 858 (1922);
Samuelson v. Samuelson, 155 Md. 639. 142 Ati. 97 (1928).
'Madden, Domestic Relations, 23; II Schouler, Domestic Relations, Sees.
1102-1104; Elfont v. Elfont, 161 Md. 458, 183 Atl. 555 (1931) ; see also
Alexander's British Statutes, 1014, 15 Geo. II, c. 30 (1742), which as inter-
preted provides that where a lunatic whose insanity has been established
by inquisition marries before he shall be declared sane, "Every such mar-
riage shall be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever." See
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818n, mental capacity to marry; 28 A. L. R. 641, 649n,
mental capacity to marry; 40 L. R. A. 737, 744n, marriage of person while
insane, L. R. A. 1916C, 703n, Marriage of mental incompetent as void or
voidable.
' Madden, Domestic Relations, 27; II Schouler, Domestic Relations, Sec.
1105; Montgomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md. 200, 122 At. 357 (1923).
0 Madden, Domestic Relations, 13-22; II Schouler, Domestic Relations,
Ch. X; Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 Atl. 114, 22 A. L. R. 810 (1922) ;
Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 Atl. 119 (1922). See also Oswald v.
Oswald, 146 Md. 313, 126 Ati. 81 (1924). As to what misrepresentations
will constitute fraud, see: 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 302 (disposition or general
character) ; 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 997 (physical or mental condition) ; 11 A. L.
R. 931 (existing pregnancy of wife).
7Madden, Domestic Relations, 10-11; II Schouler, Domestic Relations,
Sees. 1149-1150; Harlan, Domestic Relations, 32-33; Owings v. Owings, 141
Md. 416, 118 Ati. 858 (1922); Wimbrough v. Wimbrough, 125 Md. 619, 94
Atl. 168 (1915). As to what will constitute duress, see 27 L. R. A. (N. S.)
803; 43 L. R. A. 816. As to whether such marriages are void or voidable,
see L. R. A. 1916C, 706. As to whether marriage entered into to escape
prosecution for seduction may be annulled, see 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938.
For cases where duress was exercised by a third party, see 62 A. L. R. 1482.
II Schonller, Domestic Relations, See. 1187.
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duress, as a technical matter the latter is the more im-
portant legal element in the case.
With respect to duress generally, the Court of Appeals
has said9 "the duress must exist at the time of the actual
ceremony, so as to disable the one interested from acting
as a free agent, and protest must be made at that time"
and1" "the force or duress must be also the directly induc-
ing cause of entering into the marriage, and if a person, al-
though threatened with violence, refuse to enter into the
marriage by reason of such threats, and only consents to
the marriage after an appeal has been made to his honor,
the marriage is valid."
Where pre-marital relations have occurred between the
parties (as in the principal case) the Court has stated that
the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff to prove the
duress is very high. Quoting from two New Jersey cases,
the Court has said" that if "ante-nuptial incontinence has
taken place, the charge of threat or menace unlawful, or
fraud or duress, must be most fully and satisfactorily estab-
li shed before the Court will annul the marriage," and that
a complainant who seeks to bastardize "the fruit of the un-
lawful communion . . . must prove his case with the ut-
most strictness."
This rule of the higher burden of proof where pre-
marital relations had occurred might be paraphrased into
homelier language to the effect that "where the parties
ought to be married they stay married." No doubt the
rule exists because of the equity in favor of a woman who,
after being seduced and becoming pregnant, "shames" the
man into marrying her. Most cases of annulment where
duress is charged involve the husband as plaintiff and the
incident of pre-marital relations between the parties.
Whether the higher burden of proof would be imposed
simply because of pre-marital relations not followed by
pregnancy, or where the wife was plaintiff, is hard to esti-
mate, for the reason that all of our reported cases have in-
volved the husband as plaintiff and the pregnancy of the
defendant. Thus it cannot be determined whether the high
burden of proof exists to protect a woman who has simply
been betrayed or to protect the child of the union from
being bastardized. The language of the cases seems to in-
dicate that it would be imposed in either event.
I Owings v. Owings, 141 Md. 416, 419, 118 AtI. 858, 859 (1922).
10 Ibid, 141 Md. 419, 118 At. 860.
12 Ibid, 141 Md. 420, 118 AtI. 860.
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No doubt the plaintiff in the principal case stressed the
factor of his having been seduced by the woman as a cogent
fact to put her in a bad light and deprive her of the normal
sympathy existing in favor of a seduced woman who is later
sued for annulment for duress. It was probably contem-
plated that the fact of her womanly wiles and the plaintiff's
immaturity would serve to put the parties on a par with
respect to the equities of the case and the problem of proof.
The dissenting opinion disposed of the plaintiff's allegation
that he had been "seduced" by the "womanly arts of the
defendant" by saying that such an "excuse" had "been in
constant use since Eve tempted Adam with the apple and
is quite threadbare." 2 Be that as it may, both the major-
ity and the concurring opinions indicated no lessening of
the usual high burden of proof in cases of duress involving
pre-marital relations. The concurring opinion was spe-
cifically put on the difficulty of proof of the allegations.
One point of difference between the majority and the
dissenting opinions was whether the threat to have plaintiff
arrested if he did not support the expected child constituted
an actionable duress. While the majority opinion did not
specifically rule that it would be duress, yet it said: "The
averment as to her threat of sending the plaintiff to jail,
which could not have been enforced at the time of the mar-
riage (citing the Allen case'" and the applicable statute 4 )
was sufficiently definite to apprise the defendant as to the
ground of the alleged fraudulent coercion." The dissent-
ing opinion aptly disposed of this point by pointing out that
"he could not support the child until after it was born, so
that her statement was in entire accord with the statutory
law of this state."
It would seem that a threat to do that which the law per-
mits could not be considered an actionable duress in the
light of the language of the Wimbrough case to the effect
that "where a man marries to escape arrest or imprison-
ment for seduction or bastardy he cannot avoid the mar-
riage on the ground of duress, nor is a marriage induced
by threats of lawful prosecution, arrest or imprisonment,
to redress or punish a wrong, open to impeachment on that
ground."' 5  Unless we treat the majority's point as in-
12 170 Md. 435, 185 At. 678.
1s Allen v. State, 128 Md. 265, 97 Atl. 362 (1916).
1' Md. Code and Md. Code Supp., Art. 12.
1 This rule seems to be in accord with the weight of authority, see Mad-
den, Domestic Relations, 12; II Schouler, Domestic Relations, Sec. 1150;
16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938.
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volving the possibility that the defendant fraudulently per-
suaded the plaintiff to believe that he could immediately
(during the pregnancy) have been arrested, it would seem
that the dissenting opinion the better reflects the law on the
point. While fraudulent representations as to matters of
law are usually held not actionable, yet the Corder case16
had decided that fraudulent representations as to the
parties being old enough to obtain a marriage license,
among other things, were sufficient for an annulment for
fraud.
The majority and the dissenting opinions also disagreed
on the matter of laches. The majority held the defense
of laches not to be sustainable in the case while the dis-
senting opinion contended that the husband's wait for al-
most a year was entitled to consideration as showing his
acquiescence. The dissenting opinion said that the dili-
gence of the parents could not compensate for the infant
husband's delay. This makes one wonder if it be the law of
Maryland that an infant may, at one and the same time, be
incapable of litigating in his own right and yet be capable
of committing laches therein?
The dissenting opinion doubted the relevancy of the
Corder case, which the majority opinion cited. It would
seem that the Corder case has little application. In that
case the annulment was granted for false representations
as to past moral character and as to the capacity of the
parties to get a marriage license without parental consent.
There were no such representations of the former type in
this case and there could have been none of the latter type
for the reason that plaintiff knew he was too young to get
a license without parental consent as he alleged that he
waited outside while defendant got the license, for fear
that his appearance would excite suspicion.
This latter fact would also seem aptly to dispose of
plaintiff's contention that he did not understand the nature
of the marriage ceremony." The dissenting opinion went
into an aspect of this by saying: "His statement that he
did not understand what the ceremony was is wholly in-
consistent with his statement that he was induced to go
through it by threats of imprisonment."
The dissenting opinion indicates a view that plaintiff has
placed himself in an unfavorable light by asking for the an-
'e Corder v. Corder, supra note 6.
As to mistake as to the nature of the ceremony, see Madden, Domestic
Relations, 9. Samuelson v. Samuelson, atupra note 3.
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nulment, which would bastardize the child, and then asking
to have it remain in his custody. But quaere, does the bill
specifically ask that plaintiff have the custody of the childl
It asks that it be placed in a home to be selected by the
Court, where plaintiff may maintain it. This is susceptible
of the construction that plaintiff is willing to support the
child while in the custody of another. If so, this puts him
in a slightly more favorable light than the dissent indicates.
One wonders if it be the law of Maryland that the only way
the father of an illegitimate child may show interest in its
welfare is by marrying and staying married to the mother ?
One inconsistency appears in the dissenting opinion.
The marriage license was allegedly secured by perjury as
to plaintiff's age, he being under the age as of which he
should have obtained a license without parental consent."8
The dissenting opinion pointed out that this fact would not
of itself affect the validity of the marriage performed under
the license, however secured. While no Maryland case has
yet squarely decided that the fact of one of the parties being
below the age for parental consent (18 for females"0 and 21
for males) does not affect the validity of the marriage, yet
it has been assumed in Maryland, because of the similar
rule in Anglo-American jurisdictions generally, that the
requirement of parental consent is directory rather than
mandatory (lay belief to the contrary) so that if parties
under that age actually are married by a proper ceremony
the marriage is valid.2 ° This would seem to follow from
the Feehley" case which decided that a marriage (of
adults) without any license at all was nevertheless valid.2
If a marriage without any license may be valid, so should
one with a license that had been improperly secured without
requisite parental consent and by perjury as to the ages of
the parties. Thus it is that the fact of one of the parties
being under the age for parental consent does not affect
the marriage. This would also seem to follow from the
Corder case, where the annulment was granted, not because
Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 7.
1 9 Another Maryland statute Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 363, enacted before
the statute requiring parental consent for the issuance of a marriage
license to those under age, punishes a minister who marries a female under
16 or a male under 21 without parental consent.2 0 Madden, Domestic Relations, 65; Payne v. Payne, 295 Fed. 970 (Ct. of
App. of D. C. 1924).
21 Feehley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 99 Atl. 663, L. R. A. 1917C, 1017
(1916).
2 Consider Madden's comment on the Feehley case, Madden, Domestic
Relations, 65,
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the parties were actually below the age for parental consent
(which was lacking), but on the basis of the defendant's
fraudulent representations that they could secure the li-
cense without the parental consent. Surely the Court
would not have gone to the trouble of putting the case on
the more difficult ground of fraud if the law were that non-
age as such affected the validity of the marriage.
But then the dissenting opinion in the principal case
went on to say that "the only possible ground for an annul-
ment would be the non-age of the complainant, Albert, which
would make the marriage not void, but voidable."23 It is
bard either to see the consistency of this statement with
the former one, or to find authority for it.2" The only rule
of "non-age" affecting the validity of marriages is the
common law one setting up the ages of 12 for girls and 14
for boys, above which marriages otherwise properly per-
formed (in Maryland by religious ceremony) are completely
valid.25  To the knowledge of the writer, no Maryland case
or statute has altered this common law rule. Both parties
at the time of the marriage were well above these ages and
so it would seem that there is no ground of non-age avail-
able when we remember, as the dissenting opinion did, that
the statutory ages for parental consent of 18 and 21 have
reference only to whether the license ought to issue and not
to the validity of the marriage performed under the license
or without one.
If we view the bill of complaint as a whole, it might be
said that the dissenting opinion represents the preferable
view, i. e., that no case for an annulment is made out. On
the other hand if we visualize the possibility of sufficient
proof being adduced under the bill to make a case of fraudu-
lent coercion, then it would seem that the majority was cor-
rect in ordering the case to be tried on its merits.
28 170 Md. 438, 185 Atl. 679.
24 Occasional statements in cases and texts seemingly holding that the
fact of one of the parties being below the age defeats the validity of the
marriage turn out, on examination, to involve statutory rules raising the
common law "ages of consent" from 12 for females and 14 for males to
higher ages, rather than setting up a requirement of parental consent for
the issuance of the license, as is the Maryland situation. To be sure, clear
cut expression by the legislature of an intention to have parental consent
mandatory would make the rule otherwise than is the situation now in
Maryland.
15 See Long, Domestic Relations (3rd Ed.), Sec. 27 for a treatment of the
common law ages.
